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I. INTRODUCTION
Should the United States Supreme Court be the final arbiter of
abortion practice legality in the United States of America? When the
Court is placed in such a position, whether through its own doing or
through unique, combining, and compounding circumstances, can the
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would
like to thank God; my wife, Melanie, the personification of faithful dedication and
support; my daughters, Noelle Grace and Hannah Grey, for time sacrificed and
sunshine on any rainy day; Professor William J. Quirk; Professor Richard H. Seamon;
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Congress of the United States, in compliance with the Constitution,
abrogate the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over the legal topic of
abortion? Likewise, can Congress restrict the abortion subject matter
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts? If Congress is constitutionally
able to remove abortion jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts, should it do so?
The legal topic of abortion is regularly and almost unilaterally
bound and confused with the moral, ethical, and religious implications
of abortion. However, in properly examining the questions posed
above, personal and subjective considerations need not and should not
enter the decision-making equation until it is time to resolve the
"should" question. The "can" questions described above define the
legal aspects of the topic. The legal aspects are, or should be,
objective, analytical, devoid of emotion, and dependent upon
appropriate proof and supporting authority.
"[C]ongressional control of [federal court] jurisdiction raises
fundamental issues about the very nature of American constitutional
government."' It raises issues that encompass governmental checks
and balances, separation of powers, federalism, and the very structure
and history of this democratic republic. The concepts of congressional
control and removal of federal subject matter jurisdiction are not new
or unique; rather, they have provided ample and voluminous academic
discussion in the American legal community.2
This Comment applies the specific concept ofjurisdiction removal
to abortion. Beginning in Part II, it briefly reviews pertinent portions
of the federal judiciary's history. Part II also reviews the history of
concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction that encompasses
constitutional issues and the laws of the United States, legally
summarized as federal questions. It further reviews the tenets of our
system of government that balance federal judicial power against
legislative and executive power, as well as the system of checks and
balances developed by our Constitution. Specifically, Part II shows
that the composition, organization, and jurisdiction of the United
States federal courts has never been static and that the legislative
branch is empowered, through the process of congressional law-
making and within constitutional parameters, to control and define the
procedural functioning of the federal courts.
1. Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control Over the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison's Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J.
417, 433 (2000-01).
2. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895,
896 n.3 (1984) (listing journal articles that address the issues).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Part III expounds on the constitutional aspects of congressional
authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts. It shows that Congress has the plenary power,
except for the Supreme Court's few, express constitutional grants of
original jurisdiction, to restrict and to ameliorate Supreme Court and
lower federal court subject matterjurisdiction according to Congress's
collective discretion. It reviews the definition of this power contained
in Articles I and III of the Constitution and the relation of its exercise
to the Supremacy, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution. Most importantly, Part III ultimately concludes that no
constitutional obstacles exist to prevent Congress from removing all
federal jurisdiction over the subject of abortion.
Lastly, Part IV summarizes several practical considerations for
which congressional legislators drafting and supporting an abortion
jurisdiction removal bill would have to plan, ranging from the Senate
filibuster to judicial review of the abortionjurisdiction removal statute
itself.
January 22, 2003 marked the thirtieth year since the Supreme
Court's companion decisions legalizing abortion 3 practice in Roe v.
Wade4 and Doe v. Bolton.' Following the mid-term elections of 20026
and rumors that Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor may soon retire from the Supreme Court,7 the
legal and political topic of abortion is once again positioned for
takeoff on the launching pad of public interest.8 The thrust of this
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (7th ed. 1999) (defining abortion as "[t]he
spontaneous or artificially induced expulsion of an embryo or fetus"); 1 AM. JUR. 2D
Abortion and Birth Control § 1 (1994) (defining abortion as "the expulsion of the fetus
at so early a period of uterogestation that it has not acquired the power of sustaining
an independent life").
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. See David Jackson, GOP to Lead Congress into 2003, Facing Tough Issues,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 6, 2003, at A8 (noting that "[t]he GOP increased its
majority in the House and took back control of the Senate in the November (2002 mid-
term] elections"); US. Election Results, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 7, 2002,
at A12.
7. Shannon McCaffrey, GOP Win to Affect Judiciary, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Nov. 7, 2002, at A11.
8. See, e.g., David Crary, Women Who Had Abortions Long Ago Express Full
Range ofAttitudes Now, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 22, 2003, at A4 (asserting
that "[flor abortion rights advocates, the departure of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
would be most troublesome"); Jackson, supra note 6, at A8 (stating that "[President]
Bush's opponents in the Senate say too many of the judges he has nominated take too
narrow a view of ... abortion rights. That sets the stage for what many see as the
biggest political fight of the year-to fill an expected vacancy or two on the U.S.
Supreme Court."); Jill Lawrence, Democrats Differ at Abortion Rights Dinner, USA
2003] 1071
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Comment strives to catalyze political, legal, and academic discourse
and debate on the legal topic of abortion by asserting, with abundant
proof, that Congress may constitutionally extract the subject from the
federal court system and effectively return it to the state level. As a
result, this Comment asserts that the legal debate over abortion is far
from foreclosed.
II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Any credible discussion of federal appellate subject matter
jurisdiction removal requires, at minimum, a brief, foundational
background on the creation of the federal court system. Since their
outset, beginning in theory in 1787, the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, have been subject to the constitutional checks of
Congress. The Constitution ensures an intricate balance of power
among the three branches of the federal government, and it safeguards
federalism, which is the balance between the concurrent governance
of citizens simultaneously by fifty individual state governments and
the federal government.9 Specifically pertinent to this Comment, the
Constitution ensures that "the judicial power is balanced against the
House, the Senate, the executive power, and the state governments.""
The Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation, which
were proven ineffective in many areas, including the conduct of
foreign affairs, the regulation of national commerce, issues of national
currency, and appropriate responses to state factions and interests
detrimental to the union as a whole." Therefore, the Constitutional
Convention embodied the task of creating a strong national
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, at 10A (noting that "[t]he first appearance together of all six
[2004] Democratic presidential candidates" took place at a fund-raising dinner held by
NARAL Pro-Choice America, deemed by the President of the Family Research Council
as "an 'unseemly celebration of a decision that resulted in 42 million dead babies"');
Rallies Mark 30 Years Since 'Roe', USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, at 2A (quoting
President George W. Bush as stating that "'[t]he March for Life upholds the self-
evident truth of [the Declaration of Independence]-that all are created equal and given
the unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"' and quoting the
President of the National Organization for Women as stating that "' [w]e will not be the
generation that both won and lost reproductive rights in our lifetime"').
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 627 (7th ed. 1999) (defining federalism as
"[t]he relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional
governments within a federal system of government").
10. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 32 (Meridian 1956)
(1885).
11. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
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government that would have the power to enforce its mandates upon
both individuals and member states, while doing so through
institutions that would not infringe upon state and individual fights to
such an extent that they would preclude the adoption of the new form
of government by the citizenry. No example of this difficult task is
more demonstrative than the debates over the federal judiciary. The
Randolph, or Virginia Plan, of the Constitutional Convention set forth
a federal structure consisting of three branches: executive, legislative,
and judicial. 2 The establishment of a national judiciary, though an
entirely new and foreign concept outside of the areas of admiralty and
disputes among states, 3 passed unanimously at the convention on June
4, 1787. 4 However, that is where unanimity regarding the structure,
regulation, and reach of the federal court system ended.
The national judiciary was deemed originally to consist of "one
supreme tribunal and one or more inferior tribunals."'"5 The Committee
of Detail, formed to prepare the "first definite draft of the
Constitution,"'6 later solidified the Supreme Court's original and
appellate jurisdictional mandates, now contained in Article III of the
'7.Constitution, including the Exceptions Clause." However, there was
great dispute over the system of lower federal courts. On June 5, 1787,
John Rutledge, a delegate from South Carolina, challenged the
necessity of federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.'9 Mr.
Rutledge argued that the state courts provided the appropriate forum
to decide cases "in the first instance" and that the availability of appeal
"to the supreme national tribunal ... [was] sufficient to secure...
national rights and uniformity of Judgments."2 He argued that the
establishment of lower federal courts would constitute "an unnecessary
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States."'" Despite protests
from James Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of Pennsylvania
that federal courts would be necessary to alleviate the undue
multiplication of appeals, to solve the possibility of state court biases,
12. Id. at 5.
13. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 1-2 (2d ed. 1994); HART
AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 6-7 n.3 1.
14. 1 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 56 (Gaillard
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1987).
15. Id.
16. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 6.
17. See id. at 18.
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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and to adjudicate admiralty claims, Mr. Rutledge's motion to strike
"inferior tribunals" from the Constitution passed the convention.
22
Faced with the prospect of having no constitutional authority to
establish lower federal courts, Madison and Wilson seized upon an
idea earlier voiced by John Dickinson of Delaware.23 Their motion in
response, known commonly as the "Madisonian Compromise, 24
provided that the "National Legislature [would] be empowered to
institute inferior tribunals" according to its "discretion. '"25 Madison's
motion narrowly passed and its concepts became the Ordain and
Establish Clause of the Constitution26 after further word smiting by the
convention's Committees of Detail and Style.27
The Madisonian Compromise was designed to "maintain [] a
proper balance between the competing needs for political control over
an unelected judiciary and for the rule of law by an independent
judiciary. 28 Therefore, Article III of the Constitution, often referred
to as the Judiciary Article, strikes a balance between the federal
judiciary and its coordinate branches of the federal government, and
between the federal judiciary and the several states, through the
Exceptions and the Ordain and Establish Clauses. This balance was
further calibrated in the convention by four subsequent measures.
First, the president was deemed, independent of the judiciary, to
possess sole veto power over acts of Congress.29 Second, the president
was deemed, independent of the legislature, to possess sole pardoning
power for criminal offenses. 3° Third, the president was given the
power to appoint Supreme Court Justices and federal court judges,
checked by the advice and consent of the Senate.3 1 Fourth, all federal
judges were granted life tenure "during good behavior" and non-
diminishable salaries to ensure their independence from both the
branches of the federal government and the political electorate.32
22. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 8; 1 MADISON, supra note 14,
at 61.
23. 1 MADISON, supra note 14, at 61.
24. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 8.
25. Id.; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 4.
26. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
27. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 9.
28. Anderson, supra note 1, at 420 (emphasis added).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 10, 10-
11 n.59; I MADISON, supra note 14, at 69; 2 MADISON, supra note 14, at 405-06.
30. U. S. CONST. art. It, § 2, cl. 1; 2 MADISON, supra note 14, at 471.
31. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 9-10,
10 n.52.
32. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 1; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 4.
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Upon the ratification and adoption of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court and, potentially, the lower federal courts, though alive
in theory, had no tangible forms because the "judiciary article... was
not self-executing. 33  The tangible creation and subsequent
maintenance in form of our entire federal court system has since been
established through judiciary acts that Congress has passed. The first
Judiciary Act34 provides valuable insight into the intended functions
and parameters of the federal court system within our constitutional
design. There was "considerable overlap among delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and members of the First Congress"; thus,
the first Congress's Judiciary Act of 1789 helps a reader, who is 214
years removed from its passage, understand the role and breadth of the
federal judiciary envisioned by the citizens and the leaders of the
United States at the birth of the Constitution.35
One key aspect of the first Judiciary Act is that it did not grant
subject matter jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts to the extent allowable under Article III of the Constitution,36
and this is essential to properly framing the concept of Congressional
control of federal court jurisdiction. Congress is vested with the
constitutional power to expand and constrict federal courts'
jurisdiction and even to eradicate such jurisdiction when the text of the
Constitution does not expressly vest it in the federal courts. For
example, the Act did not grant general federal question jurisdiction to
lower federal courts, but, instead, limited such jurisdiction to specific
constitutional controversies, as enumerated in the Act.37 Additionally,
the first Judiciary Act did not grant the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction to review criminal cases38 and did not give the Court
appellate jurisdiction over federal constitutional law claims when state
33. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 28; see U.S. CONST. art. III.
34. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
35. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 9 ( "[T]he [first] Judiciary Act is especially
important in understanding the federal court system because... [it] 'was passed by the
first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken
part in framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its
true meaning."') (citation omitted); Gunther, supra note 2, at 906; see also HART AND
WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 28 ( "[T]he first Judiciary Act is widely viewed as an
indicator of the original understanding of Article III and, in particular, of Congress'
constitutional obligations concerning the vesting of federal jurisdiction.").
36. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 32.
37. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73; CHEMERINSKY, supra note
13, at 11; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over The Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1031-32 (1981-82); Gunther, supra note 2, at 913.
38. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73; CHEMERINSKY, supra note
13, at 10; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 33.
2003] 1075
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courts had upheld such claims in favor of the claimant.39 The Judiciary
Act further established removal jurisdiction,4 ° though this jurisdiction
is nowhere referenced in the Constitution. It also set the number of
Supreme Court Justices at six, 4' requiring the "justices [to] ride circuit
rather than [authorizing the appointment ofi permanent judges to the
courts of appeals." '42
Subsequent judiciary acts and other acts of Congress also provide
examples of both "incremental adjustment[s] of federal jurisdiction to
reflect shifting political currents ' 43 and Congress's capacity to
constitutionally mandate the federal court system's organization and
structure. For example, the number of Justices comprising the
Supreme Court bench fluctuated until 1869, beginning at six in 1789,
rising to ten in 1864, lowering to seven in 1866, and settling at nine in
1869 where the number presently remains. 44 Also, the Judiciary Act of
1801, commonly termed the "Law of the Midnight Judges," created
permanent judgeships on the circuit courts, allowing federalists to
appoint and confirm numerous federal judges after losing control of
"both Congress and the Presidency in the elections of 1800.""4
However, the new anti-federalist Congress and President Jefferson
repealed the law through the Judiciary Act of 1802,46 returning largely
to the pre-existing circuit court structure and "abolish[ing] the [newly
federalist-created] judgeships."47
Following the Civil War, from 1863-1875, "Reconstruction
Congresses" repeatedly expanded the subject matterjurisdiction of the
federal courts to protect against fragmented, inconsistent, and state-
biased decisions.48 In 1875, jurisdiction expansion was evident when
Congress granted federal district courts general and original federal
question jurisdiction to adjudicate cases and controversies arising
39. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73; CHEMERINSKY, supra note
13, at 11; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 33.
40. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73; CHEMERINSKY, supra note
13, at 11.
41. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73; CHEMERINSKY, supra note
13, at 10.
42. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 10; see also Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 73 (stating that circuit courts were to be held annually and "shall consist
of any two justices of the supreme court, and the district judge of such districts, any
two of whom shall constitute a quorum").
43. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 34.
44. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 2 1.
45. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 34.
46. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 268, 2 Stat. 132.
47. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 34.
48. See id. at 35-36.
1076
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss4/12
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.49
Subsequently, in 1914, "Congress expanded the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction to encompass for the first time cases in which a
state court rendered a decision favorable to a claim of federal right."5
Additionally, Congress has shaped the evolution of the federal
courts of appeals. The first Judiciary Act created circuit courts,
possessing both original and appellate jurisdiction, as the second tier
of the federal court system." The Evarts Act of 189152 created the
courts of appeals, giving them the appellate jurisdiction previously
held by the circuit courts. However, the Act did not abolish the circuit
courts.5 3 The structure of the courts of appeals today is essentially the
same as that set forth in the Evarts Act, except that the number of
regional courts of appeals has risen to eleven. 4 Congress subsequently
abolished the circuit courts in 1911, conferring upon the district courts
the circuit courts' previous original jurisdiction.5 Congress has also
mandated that federal courts of appeals have sole jurisdiction over all
appeals taken from final judgments of the district courts, except those
controversies that are allowed to be directly appealed to the Supreme
Court.
56
As a final example of Congress's power over the structure of the
federal court system, Congress has gradually shaped the method by
which appeals are taken from state and lower federal courts to the
Supreme Court. At its outset, the Supreme Court heard appeals that
were brought by writ of error and were within the limits of its
authorized jurisdiction. 7 Congress refined this process by using
mandatory appeals and, finally, by giving the Supreme Court
discretionary review of appeals through writs of certiorari.58 Currently,
almost all appeals heard by the Supreme Court are by writ of
49. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; HARTAND WECHSLER, supra note
11, at 36.
50. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 38 (citing Act of Dec. 23, 1914, 38
Stat. 790).
5 1. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
52. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
53. Id.
54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 24. This number does not include the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, which raise the total number of federal courts of appeals to thirteen. Id.
55. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 1,36 Stat. 1807 (1911).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
57. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 22.
58. See id. at 21-22; see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 37 (dis-
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certiorari.5 9 Through this gradual, structure-shaping process of
congressional legislation, the federal court system "currently includes
the Supreme Court, thirteen courts of appeals, ninety-four federal
district courts, and several specialized federal courts."60
This brief and sweeping historical overview of our federal court
system provides a factual backdrop for one purpose: to show that the
composition, organization, and jurisdiction of the federal courts is not
static. Through the mass proliferation of television, radio, and internet
media, most Americans undoubtedly have some understanding or, at
least, awareness of concurrent state and federal court systems.
However, this necessary historical background cements the assertion
that the legislative branch, through the process of lawmaking between
Congress and the President, is empowered to effectively control the
procedural functioning of the federal court system within the
constitutional parameters placed upon Congress, the President, and the
judiciary.6 The concept of jurisdiction removal is simply a
constitutional, congressional application of the Ordain and Establish62
and Exceptions Clauses63 of the Constitution that has been exercised
repeatedly throughout our history. Jurisdiction removal, in actuality,
is nothing more than a congressional statute's constriction or retraction
of previously existing Supreme Court and federal court jurisdiction,
according to the collective judgment and discretion of Congress and
the President.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT SUPREME COURT AND
LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Judiciary Article (Article III) of the Constitution reads, in
part, as follows:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish....
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 22.
60. Id. at 19.
61. See generally id. at 19 (stating that the current federal court structure and
"current specification of jurisdiction of [federal] courts ... are the product[s] of
numerous changes adopted in many statutes adopted since the Judiciary Act of 1789").
62. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
63. U.S. CONST., art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
1078
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of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority ....
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.64
In light of this language, may Congress relieve the Supreme Court of
appellate subject matter jurisdiction over particular legal topics?
Likewise, may Congress proscribe subject matter jurisdiction over the
same legal topics in lower federal courts? Those who review the text
of
the [E]xceptions [C]lause . . . with respect to the
Supreme Court and who accept the widely held view
about broad congressional control of lower federal
court jurisdiction find it hard to see anything in
article III that would bar congressional action, as a
matter of sheer constitutional power, to remand
federal constitutional issues for final state court
adjudication. Such a ... [reading] seems consistent
with the constitutional language and the Framers'
intent, especially because state courts, at the outset
and for decades after, were envisioned as not only
the competent enforcers but indeed the primary
enforcers of federal law.65
64. U.S. Const. art. Il, §§ 1-2 (emphasis added to the Ordain and Establish and
the Exceptions Clauses).
65. Gunther, supra note 2, at 914; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Wechsler comments:
The first Congress did not face the problem of building a
legal system . . . it started with the premise that the standing
corpusjuris of the country was provided by the states. As with
the law, so with the courts. One federal Supreme Court was
essential and the Constitution gave a mandate that it be
established. But even the establishment of lower courts was left
an open question by the Framers, as was the jurisdiction to be
vested in any such courts as Congress might establish . . ..
Congress was free to commit the administration of national law
to national tribunals or to leave the task to the state courts ....
20031 1079
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To avoid becoming mired in a clich6 historical debate over what
the members of the Constitutional Convention intended, the gauntlet
must be thrown down at this earlyjuncture. While Professor Gunther's
quote above is accurate, the remainder of this Comment will show that
if the text of the Constitution and the concepts of checks and balances,
judicial review, stare decisis, separation of powers, federalism, and a
republican form of representative government mean anything today,
then there can be no doubt that Congress may constitutionally retract
jurisdiction over specific subject matter cases and controversies from
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. Such subject-matter
cases unequivocally include controversies encompassing the legal
topic of abortion. After applying the concepts listed above, the text of
the Constitution, and the existing case law to abortion, the only
remaining questions are whether Congress should do so and why.
While ripe for debate, these questions must be answered by
congressional legislators and their constituents; therefore, they will not
be directly addressed in this Comment.
Throughout our history, congressional legislators have curtailed
federal subject matter jurisdiction by introducing bills on the House
and Senate floors.66 In fact, the specific concept of removing federal
court abortion jurisdiction is not new or unique.6" Although Supreme
Court case law on the topic of jurisdiction removal is limited,6" the
case law that does exist is overwhelmingly determinative and clear on
the issue.
A. Authority to Restrict Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
The Exceptions Clause of Article III states that "the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
Even the appellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court was subject
to congressional control.
Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted).
66. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 418 n.6, 419 n.19 (listing bills);
Gunther, supra note 2, at 895-96 n.2, 897 (listing hearings and discussing bills);James
McClellan, Congressional Retraction of Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect the
Reserved Powers of the States: The Helms Prayer Bill and a Return to First
Principles, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1981-82) (describing the number of
introduced bills as "countless"); Scott Moss, An Appeal by Any Other Name:
Congress's Empty Victory over Habeas Rights-Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333
(1996), 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249, 251 n. 11 (1997) (listing bills).
67. See, e.g., H.R. 867, 97th Cong. (1981) ("A bill to limit thejurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the district courts in certain cases [abortion]" introduced by
Representative Philip Crane of Illinois.).
68. Gunther, supra note 2, at 897; Moss, supra note 66, at 251.
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make."69 This mandate has enjoyed limited, but conclusive,
consideration in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In 1810, twenty-one years after the Judiciary Act of 1789
established the Supreme Court,70 Chief Justice Marshall addressed the
topic for the first time in Durousseau v. United States." In
Durousseau the Attorney General moved to dismiss "several writs of
error" from various judgments that the U.S. District Court for the
District of Orleans entered in favor of the United States.72 The United
States argued that the "act erecting Louisiana into two territories" and
establishing a district court in the territory of Orleans, "consist[ing] of
one judge ... [exercising] the same jurisdiction ... [as] the judge of
the Kentucky District," did not grant the Supreme Court the same
authority of appellate review over Orleans cases that the Court had
over Kentucky cases.73 In determining that it did have the same
appellate jurisdiction in Orleans cases, the Court expounded upon its
original and appellate jurisdiction as defined by the Constitution.74
Chief Justice Marshall elaborately set forth the following
statements that shaped subsequent case law covering jurisdiction
removal by Congress:
The appellate powers of this court are not given by
the judicial act. They are given by the constitution.
But they are limited and regulated by the judicial
act, and by such other acts as have been passed on
the subject.
When the first legislature of the union proceeded
to carry the third article of the constitution into
effect, they must be understood as intending to
execute the power they possessed of making
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court .... They have not declared that the
appellate power of the court shall not extend to
certain cases; but they have described affirmatively
its jurisdiction.., understood to imply a negative on
the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it. 71
69. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
70. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
71. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
72. Id. at 309.
73. Id. at 309-10.
74. See id. at 318.
75. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
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Clear conclusions may be drawn from the eloquent writing of
Chief Justice Marshall. First, the appellate jurisdiction that the
Constitution grants the Supreme Court may be limited, regulated, and
excepted by Congress, in accordance with Congress's constitutionally
vested legislative powers, through the passage of acts that encompass
the topic of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Second, not only
may Congress declare that certain cases are excepted from Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction, but its affirmative description of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, alone, carries a negative inference that
prohibits the Supreme Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction
over controversies not within the intent of that affirmative description.
Marshall went on to explain that, should Congress specifically
intend to except certain cases from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, such an intent "would require plain words to establish
th[at] construction."76 Marshall furthered this analysis by adding that
"to imply an exception against the intent" of Congress, as evidenced
by Congress's affirmative description in the Judiciary Act of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, "would be repugnant to every
principle of sound construction."77 This quotation supports the
inference that Congress is fully and constitutionally empowered to
except certain cases from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
when it is done so in plain language. However, the Court should not
glean such an exception if the exception is contrary to the intent
evidenced by Congress through its decision to use an affirmative rather
than a restrictive description of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Durousseau provided the foundation for the seminal case, Ex
Parte McCardle,78 which in 1868 defined the current legal landscape
of the issue. In McCardle a man held in military custody appealed the
U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi judgment,
which denied him the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.7 9 The
amended Judiciary Act of 1867 created the U.S. circuit courts and
authorized appeals of all judgments rendered by the circuit courts to
be within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.8" However,
another act was passed in 1868 while McCardle was pending before
the Supreme Court-after a presidential veto and after a super-
majority vote of Congress overrode the veto." The subsequent Act
specifically repealed that portion of the 1867 Act which granted the
76. Id. at 316.
77. Durousseau, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 318.
78. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
79. Id. at 507.
80. Id at 506-07.
81. Id. at 580.
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Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals encompassing writs
of habeas corpus.82 In dismissing the case for want of subject matter
jurisdiction, Chief Justice Chase stated the following in the unanimous
opinion of the Court:
[T]he appellate jurisdiction of this court is not
derived from acts of Congress. It is, strictly
speaking, conferred by the Constitution. But it is
conferred "with such exceptions and under such
regulations as Congress shall make."
The source of that jurisdiction, and the
limitations of it by the Constitution and by statute,
have been on several occasions subjects of
consideration here....
... [T]he affirmation [by Congressional statute]
of [Supreme Court] appellate jurisdiction implies the
negation of all such jurisdiction not affirmed ....
The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the
case before us . . . is not an inference from the
affirmation of other appellate jurisdiction. It is made
in terms. The provision of the act of 1867, affirming
the appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases of
habeas corpus is expressly repealed. It is hardly
possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive
exception.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives
of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution; and thepower to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this
[Clourt is given by express words.
... Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining
to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.83
McCardle involved Congress's direct and express removal of
specific types of cases from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. The specific types of cases extracted from the Court's appellate
jurisdiction involved a constitutional right guaranteed to individuals:
82. Id.
83. Id. at 512-14 (emphasis added).
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that of habeas corpus.8 4 Therefore, McCardle established certain rules
of law. First, the power to except Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
is vested in Congress by the Constitution. Second, Congress may
relieve the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over specific
types of cases by passing an act that expressly and clearly does so.8"
Third, Congress may relieve the Supreme Court of appellate
jurisdiction in specific cases that encompass constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights.
Because the Supreme Court has not overruled any of these rules
of law, they presently continue to govern the Supreme Court in its
decision-making regarding jurisdiction removal through the doctrine
of stare decisis. They are thus currently unassailable from a strictly
legal perspective.
It is fashionable today to stress that McCardle is
special and distinguishable; nevertheless, the
language of the Court in McCardle plainly
proceeded on the assumption that Congress's power
[to restrict the subject matter appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court] is plenary; and this is the only
Supreme Court opinion squarely on point.86
"The text of article III, the McCardle decision, the bulk of Supreme
Court dicta, congressional practice, and the constitutional scheme of
checks and balances all contribute to a compelling argument that there
are no ... internal limits on Congress' article III power to limit the
Court's appellate jurisdiction."87
Since McCardle, the Supreme Court has deftly avoided the topic
of congressional limitation of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. However, a closer look at the case law surrounding the
statutory limitations on federal appellate jurisdiction8 gives rise to two
fair conclusions. First, no act of Congress has been followed by an
appropriate set of circumstances since McCardle that has required the
Supreme Court to revisit its conclusions in Durousseau and McCardle.
84. See U. S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
85. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (stating that "where
Congress intends to precludejudicial review of contitutional claims its intent to do so
must be clear").
86. Bator, supra note 37, at 1040.
87. Gunther, supra note 2, at 908; see also James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1433, 1511 (2000) (stating that "the Court itself has had little to say about the
limits, if any, on the scope of legislative control over its appellate jurisdiction").
88. See infra Part III.B.
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Second, nothing in the Supreme Court's abundant case law upholding
congressional limitations on lower federal court subject matter
jurisdiction 9 indicates that the same conclusion would not have
resulted if different circumstances had caused such congressional
limitations to also apply to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
The Exceptions Clause of Article III is clear on its face and in its
terms, and Supreme Court case law is in clear agreement with those
terms. Thus, Congress has the discretionary, plenary power to relieve
the Supreme Court of appellate subject matter jurisdiction over
particular legal topics encompassing individual constitutional rights,
including abortion.
B. Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
The Ordain and Establish Clause ofArticle III states, "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."9" Little uncertainty and debate surround the concept of
congressional removal ofjurisdiction over a particular legal topic from
the lower federal courts.
For example, in Sheldon v. Sill9 the "Judiciary Act" proscribed
otherwise allowable diversity jurisdiction of U.S. circuit courts in "any
suit to recover the contents of any ... chose in action, in favor of an
assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court" by
the original owner of the debt.92 The plaintiff in Sheldon, a New York
citizen and assignee of debt owed by Sheldon who was a citizen of
Michigan, challenged the constitutionality of this restriction on federal
court jurisdiction.93 He claimed it violated the federal enumerated
judicial power to determine "'controversies between citizens of
different States."' 94 Because the original owner of the debt, a citizen
of Michigan, could not have satisfied the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held, in accordance with the Judiciary
Act, that Sill, as assignee, could not prosecute the action in federal
court.
9 5
In upholding the jurisdictional restriction that Congress placed
upon federal courts, the Court opined that
89. See id.
90. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. I (emphasis added).
91. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
92. Id. at 448.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
95. See id. at 450.
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Congress may withhold from any court of its
creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies. Courts created by statute can have no
jurisdiction but such as the statute confers ....
... The political truth is, that the disposal of the
judicial power (except in a few specified instances)
belongs to Congress; and Congress is not bound to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every
subject, in every form which the Constitution might
warrant.
• . ."[T]he same doctrine has been frequently
asserted by this court .... 96
Thus, Sheldon provides a helpful rule of law. Congress may
constitutionally limit the jurisdiction of any federal court that was
created by congressional statute because the statutory power that
creates the court itself possesses the authority to create and define the
court's jurisdiction. The emphasized portions of the Court's dicta
above reiterate the concepts of Durousseau v. United States97and Ex
Parte McCardle,98 clearly evidencing the theory that, although the
Supreme Court was created by Article III of the Constitution rather
than by a congressional act, its jurisdiction is also subject to the
formulation of Congress's discretion, when not expressly enumerated
within the text of the Constitution.
There are numerous other examples of Congress's power to
remove lower federal court jurisdiction. During the Great Depression,
Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,99 a pro-labor
statute that greatly limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to enjoin
labor protests. 00 In Laufv. E. G. Shinner & Co. "' the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the picketing of its business by a labor union.0 2 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the district court that issued the
injunction for want ofjurisdiction.° 3 The Court stated that "[t]here can
be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States."'0 4 Therefore,
96. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
97. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
98. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
99. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
100. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 189.
101. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
102. Id. at 325.
103. Id. at 331.
104. Id. at 330.
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Lauf exemplifies Congress's ability to specifically restrict otherwise
available,jurisdictionally-based remedies of federal courts, such as the
ability to issue injunctive relief, in cases involving particular legal
issues.
During World War II, Congress passed the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942,'0' which was designed to allow the federal
government to control and cap prices on food sales, other
commodities, and rents.' 6 The Act required any protests of the
government-regulated prices to be filed with a Price Control
Administrator, whose final determination could only be appealed to
the Emergency Court of Appeals, which was created by the Act and
consisted of three federal judges.' 7 The Act also provided that only
Emergency Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court "had authority
to determine the [constitutional] validity of a [price] regulation or
provide injunctive relief."' 8 The Price Control Act thus denied
entirely all jurisdiction of lower federal courts on the issue of price
controls.
Cases involving the Price Control Act included Lockerty v.
Phillips,'9 in which several meat wholesalers brought a cause of
action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of
government price controls and seeking injunctive relief." 0 Affirming
the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court held:
There is nothing in the Constitution which
requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on
any particular inferior federal court . . . . The
Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior
[federal] courts includes the power "of investing
them with jurisdiction . . . and of withholding
jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good."'' .
Yakus v. United States also adjudicated issues regarding the Price
Control Act. In Yakus the defendants in a criminal prosecution that
105. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23.
106. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419 (1944).
107. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 189.
108. Id.
109. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
110. Id. at 184.
111. Id. at 187 (citations omitted).
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was initiated in federal district court asserted as a defense to the
charges against them that price regulations instituted by the
administrator pursuant to the Price Control Act were
unconstitutional.2 Yakus is unique and extremely important to the
argument in favor of congressional jurisdictional control for several
reasons.
First, to reiterate, Yakus involved a criminal prosecution that was
initiated in a United States district court, although the Price Control
Act barred such courts from determining the constitutional validity of
the regulations whose violation created the criminal offense.' Relying
on Lockerty, the Supreme Court held that, by failing to utilize the
statutorily mandated and specified administrative andjudicial avenues
(the Price Control administrator and the Emergency Court of Appeals)
to challenge the constitutionality of the regulation, the defendant
essentially "forfeited" the right to raise the issue before the Court." 4
Without further examination, this stance by the Court does not present
a very unique holding. However, the second important point from
Yakus lies in the Court's reasoning.
Yakus's argument was not allowed by the Supreme Court because
Lockerty clearly mandated that the district court had no jurisdiction to
hear such a challenge." 5 In affirming Congress's constitutional
authority to relieve the federal courts of jurisdiction, the Court
expanded this notion by disallowing a basic individual right to
challenge the constitutionality of a federal regulation because the
defendant did not use the appropriate remedial avenues identified by
the statute.''
6
In 1973, the Supreme Court reiterated its consistent stance on the
matter of congressional dictation of lower federal court jurisdiction in
Palmore v. United States. "7 Quoting an 1845 Supreme Court case, the
Court stated:
"[T]he judicial power of the United States... is
(except in enumerated instances, applicable
exclusively to this court) dependent for its
distribution and organization, and for the modes of
its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress,
who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals
112. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 418-19 (1944).
113. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 190.
114. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 444-46; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 190.
115. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 429-30.
116. Id.
117. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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(inferior to the Supreme Court)... and of investing
them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or
exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them
in the exact degrees and character which to Congress
may seem proper for the public good.""'
However, although this language shows the Court's continuing
assertion of Congress's plenary power to assign and restrict the
jurisdiction of lower federal courts, Palmore did not involve the
removal ofjurisdiction. Instead, it involved the congressional grant of
jurisdiction to local District of Columbia courts. 19 In addition to the
quote above, the importance of Palmore lies in the Court's discussion
of due process considerations implicated by Congress's manipulation
of federal and state court jurisdiction by statute. 2 ' As a result,
Palmore will be revisited and discussed in detail in the due process
section of this Comment.' 2
In 1999, the Supreme Court again indicated its deference to
congressional limitations on lower federal court subject matter
jurisdiction in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee.122 In Reno the eight defendants were identified as
members and fund raisers' 23 of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, a group that the United States characterized "as an
intemational terrorist and communist organization."' 24 As a result, in
1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced
deportation proceedings against six of the defendants as temporary
residents for "routine status violations such as overstaying a visa and
failure to maintain student status"'12' and against two of the defendants
as permanent residents under the McCarran-Walter Act and,
subsequently, the Immigration Act of 1990, which allowed permanent
residents to be deported for "terrorist activity." '26
In 1987, the defendants filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California seeking injunctive relief from the
initiation of deportation proceedings against them. 27 They alleged,
inter alia, that the selective-enforcement of routine status requirements
118. Id. at 401 (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845)).
119. See id. at 407-08.
120. See id. at 409-10.
121. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
122. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
123. Id. at 475.
124. Id. at 473, 475.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 473-74, 474 n.2.
127. Id. at 473.
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against them because they were members of a politically unpopular or
disfavored terrorist organization violated their First and Fifth
Amendment constitutional rights. 2 ' In various forms, the case "made
four trips through the District Court for the Central District of
California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit" and arrived at the Supreme Court in 1999.129 The district court
had enjoined INS's deportation proceedings against all eight
defendants, and the U.S. Attorney General had appealed the decision
to the court of appeals."13
While the Attorney General's appeal was pending before the
Ninth Circuit, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 3' Prior to the
passage of the IIRIRA, judicial review of all final deportation orders
was exclusively assigned to the courts of appeals by the "special
statutory-review provision" of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).'32 The court of appeals had held that the district court could
entertain the claim for proper factual development under either general
federal questionjurisdiction or the generaljurisdiction provided by the
INA.'33 The IIRIRA "repealed the old judicial-review scheme"
regarding deportation proceedings and specified "significantly more
restrictive" federal court subject matter jurisdiction parameters. 134 It
established the general guideline "that the revised procedures for
removing aliens, including the judicial-review procedures... [did] not
apply to aliens who were already in either exclusion or deportation
proceedings on IIRIRA's effective date."'' 35 However, § 306(c)(1) of
the IIRIRA expressly mandated that the exclusive jurisdiction
provision of the IIRIRA 3 6 applied "'without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending, or future . . . deportation . . .
proceedings,"' regardless of their status on the effective date of the
act.
37
The exclusive jurisdiction provision of the IIRIRA states the
following:
128. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 472-73.
129. Id. at 474.
130. Id. at 475.
131. Id. at 473,475.
132. Id. at 476.
133. Id. at 476-77.
134. Reno, 525 U.S. at 475.
135. Id. at 477 (referring to § 309(c)(I) of IIRIRA).
136. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2000).
137. Reno, 525 U.S. at 477 (citation omitted).
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Except as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this [chapter]."'
Applying this newly enacted statute, the Supreme Court held that
neither it nor the federal courts below had jurisdiction any longer over
a selective enforcement claim made by an alien challenging the
constitutionality of the Attorney General's decision to commence
deportation proceedings against him. 39 The Court explained that the
executive branch, through its agents, the Attorney General, and the
INS, had regularly engaged in the practice of "deferred action," which
essentially consisted of the Attorney General's discretionary
abandonment of deportation proceedings for humanitarian or
convenience purposes. 4 ' Under the previous statutory judicial review
scheme, federal courts had worked around the restriction that
exclusively confined judicial review to final orders of deportation,
finding that the restriction was "inapplicable to various decisions and
actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of deportation,
and rel[ying] on other jurisdictional statutes to permit review.'' 41
Congress had reacted with the IIRIRA by specifically excluding
particular discretionary decisions or actions of the executive branch
during the process of deportation from judicial review, including
decisions or actions to "commence proceedings."' 42
Upholding the jurisdictional constriction, the Court noted that
"[s]ection 1252(g) was directed [by Congress] against a particular evil:
attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial
discretion"'43 and that Congress specifically made this jurisdiction
restriction applicable to cases challenging the commencement of
deportation proceedings which were pending as of the effective date
of the Act." ' The Court stated that "[i]t is entirely understandable...
why Congress would want only the discretion-protecting provision of
§ 1252(g) applied even to pending cases: because that provision is
138. § 1252(g).
139. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 487, 492.
140. Id. at 483-84.
141. Id. at 485.
142. Id. at 482.
143. Id. at486 n.9.
144. Id. at 483, 485-87.
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specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence
prolongation of removal proceedings."'' 45 As a result, the Court
vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit that had affirmed the district
court's injunction of deportation proceedings against the defendants,
and the Court ordered the decision of the district court be vacated.'46
In doing so, the Reno Court again showed deference to express,
congressional removal of federal subject matter jurisdiction that has
defined Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject for over 190
years.
The text of the Ordain and Establish Clause"7 is clear on its face
and has been repeatedly interpreted by the Supreme Court as
signifying Congress' discretionary, plenary power to restrict lower
federal court jurisdiction. The power to restrict such jurisdiction
includes the ability to retract previously authorized or allowed
jurisdiction and includes the ability to remove previously existing
jurisdiction of specific legal issues, rights, and claims, as well as
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In fact,
not a single Supreme Court case can be cited casting
... doubt on the validity of the hundreds of statutes
premised on the notion that it is for Congress to
decide which, if any, of the cases to which the
federal judicial power extends should be litigated in
the first instance in the lower federal courts. '48
Applying the text of Article III with the abundant case law on the
issue, there can be no doubt that an act of Congress proscribing lower
federal court jurisdiction over the legal topic of abortion would be
constitutional pursuant to the Judiciary Artile.
C. Other Constitutional Mandates and Considerations
Obviously, there are more constitutional considerations in
removing federal court subject matter jurisdiction than those that lie
solely in Article III. The issues addressed above are commonly
referred to as internal restraints-those directly arising from the text
of Article 1II. 14' External restraints upon Congress's power to retract
federal jurisdiction may be inferred from other textual portions of the
145. Reno, 525 U.S. at 487.
146. Id. at 492.
147. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
148. Bator, supra note 37, at 1032.
149. Gunther, supra note 2, at 900.
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Constitution. 5 ' In other words, "Congress' power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts [and to except the appellate
subject matter jurisdiction of the Supreme Court] cannot be exercised
in a manner that violates some other Constitutional rule [outside of
Article III].''
1. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 1
5 2
Some scholars have posited that an act removing all federal
subject matter and appellate jurisdiction over a particular legal issue
could result in frozen Supreme Court precedent that would continue
to bind state courts through the Supremacy Clause, effectively
rendering the act useless.' Any such argument is a fallacy for two
reasons. First, the Constitution is the supreme law of the United States
while constitutional law is only the interpretation of that law, binding
temporally only until modified or altered through methods enumerated
or properly inferred from the Constitution. Second, a law removing
federal and Supreme Court jurisdiction over a particular legal area
would simply relegate former binding, mandatory precedent to a new
position of being only persuasive authority (albeit very persuasive
150. Id.
151. Bator, supra note 37, at 1034; see also Gunther, supra note 2, at 900
(asserting that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses can provide potential
limitations to Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause).
152. U. S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
153. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 182 (summarizing arguments
that former Supreme Court precedent on an issue would "remain the law" and that state
courtjudges would still be bound to follow the precedent to "remain true to their oath
of office"); id. at 186 (summarizing the argument that precluding federal review would
effectively make state law "supreme" over federal law); Bator, supra note 37, at 1041
(describing possibility of law "frozen" "into the shape given it by the last Supreme
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through the historical and well-deserved prestige of the Supreme
Court).
One does not need to look any further than Edwin Meese's 1987
address to a symposium at Tulane Law School, which encompassed
the authoritativeness of Supreme Court decisions, for an inclusive
tutorial on the first proposition. Meese, while serving as U.S. Attorney
General, expounded:
This is the necessary distinction between the
Constitution and constitutional law....
... [The Constitution] creates the institutions of
our government, it enumerates the powers those
institutions may wield, and it cordons off certain
areas into which government may not enter....
The Constitution is... the instrument by which
the consent of the governed ... is transformed into
a government complete with the powers to act and a
structure designed to make it act wisely or
responsibly .... The Constitution . is ... "the
supreme Law of the Land."
Constitutional law, on the other hand, is that
body of law that has resulted from the Supreme
Court's adjudications involving disputes over
constitutional provisions or doctrines.'54
To demonstrate this difference, consider how the enormous bulk
of constitutional law in over 530 volumes of the United States Reports
"stands in marked contrast to the few, slim paragraphs that have been
added to the original Constitution as amendments."' 55
The Supreme Court would face quite a dilemma if its
own constitutional decisions really were the supreme
law of the land, binding on all persons and
governmental entities, including the Court itself, for
then the Court would not be able to change its mind.
It could not overrule itself in a constitutional case.
154. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 981-82
(1987); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (observing
that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land first, followed by the laws of the
United States made in accordance therewith).
155. Meese, supra note 154, at 982.
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Yet we know that the Court has done so on
numerous occasions.•
56
Meese very effectively went on to discuss the issue of supremacy,
using the Lincoln and Douglas debates that revolved around the Dred
Scott v. Sanford"57 decision as an example of the theoretical difference
between the Constitution and constitutional law. ' Lincoln essentially
espoused the same view that Meese asserted in 1987, a concept that is
as applicable today as it was in 1861. Meese explained:
[I]f the policy of government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed
by decisions of the Supreme Court the instant they
are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in
personal actions, the people will... cease[] to be
their own rulers, having to that extent, practically
resigned their government into the hands of that
imminent tribunal.
... [They will have] submit[ted] to government
by the judiciary. But such a state could never be
consistent with the principles of our Constitution. 
51
The first proposition-that the Constitution, not constitutional
law, is the supreme law of the United States and thus enjoys the
unilateral protection of the Supremacy Clause-renders the second
proposition-that jurisdiction removal would convert former
mandatory national authority to persuasive authority for future cases
covering the legal topic involved-a common-sense formality. Prior
Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions on the particular legal
topic would not disappear from the official legal reporters. Simply
stated, after jurisdiction over a particular topic was restricted or
ameliorated, "disfavored rulings [of the Supreme Court] would remain
on the books as influential precedents. State courts . . . in many
instances would follow those prior rulings. Other courts no doubt
would . . . follow their own constitutional interpretations
[because]... the threat of [federal] appellate review and reversal were
removed."1
60
156. Id. at 983.
157. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 397 (1856).
158. Id. at 988-89.
159. See Meese, supra note 154, at 989 (asserting the proposition by paraphras-
ing portions of President Lincoln's first Inaugural Address).
160. Gunther, supra note 2, at 910-11.
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No matter what the Supreme Court's temporal and historically
fluctuating interpretation of constitutional provisions may be, the
Constitution, not Supreme Court jurisprudence, is the law of this
land. '6 All three branches of the government are responsible for
continuously interpreting the Constitution. 62 As a result, the
Supremacy Clause does not provide a legitimate obstacle to a properly
drafted congressional statute relieving the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts of all subject matter jurisdiction over abortion. It
would merely relegate former mandatory Supreme Court authority to
persuasive authority.
2. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o
person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 63 The Fourteenth Amendment asserts that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." '164 The legal topic of abortion encompasses theories
of constitutional liberty. 65 The Fifth Amendment expressly protects
such constitutional liberty from deprivation by the federal government
without due process of law.'66 However, an abortion jurisdiction
removal statute passed by Congress would not be hindered by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for two reasons. First, the
Constitution provides no guarantee that due process of law regarding
the deprivation of constitutional liberty must consist of federal court
adjudication or must involve potential appellate review by the
Supreme Court. Second, state court systems, held accountable by the
161. See Meese, supra note 154, at 983.
162. Id. at 985-86.
163. U. S. CONST. amend. V.
164. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
165. For example, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court noted that it had
recognized that [an inferred] right of personal privacy.., does
exist under the Constitution .... [O]nly personal rights that can
be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," . . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy.... [T]he right has some extension to activities relating
to ... procreation ....
This right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The Court held that the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. Id. at 158.
166. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are constitutionally
empowered, as institutions with concurrent jurisdiction, to vindicate,
protect, and adjudicate individual constitutional rights, constituting
due process of law, without federal court participation.
As stated in the previous section, a congressional statute removing
all jurisdiction from federal courts over the legal topic of abortion
would, in effect, relegate the topic to state courts for all future legal
determination. This fact raises two prongs that require discussion.
First, the statute itself could not constitute a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. Second, the actual effects of the statute
could not give rise to the deprivation of constitutional liberties without
due process of law.
The first proposition is instantly dismissed because a
congressional statute that relieved federal courts of jurisdiction over
abortion, passed in accordance with Congress' constitutionally
mandated legislative powers' 67 and in clear compliance with the
Judiciary Article's internal restraints,'68 would not constitute a
deprivation of a constitutional liberty. The liberty right involved in
such an argument is most succinctly described as a right to a federal
legal forum for the vindication of individual constitutional rights. No
such constitutional liberty right exists.
Alexander Hamilton correctly stated that "[l]aws are a dead letter,
without courts to expound and define their true meaning."' 69 The
United States has historically relied upon and presently relies upon a
concurrent system of federal and state courts to accomplish this
process. "It is widely agreed that due process does assure access to
some judicial forum in many circumstances. . . . [H]owever, due
process . . . [does] not . . . require access to a federal judicial
forum."'
17 0
Due process also provides a "barrier to wholly arbitrary
legislation."' 7 ' As a result, a congressionaljurisdiction removal statute
dependent upon arbitrary criteria like, for example, "a litigant's height,
weight, or hair color" would not survive constitutional scrutiny.1
7
1
Conversely, a legitimate exercise of express constitutional authority,
such as the alignment of jurisdiction among federal and state courts,
could never be viably attacked as arbitrary. Additionally, assuming
167. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
168. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (Ordain and Establish Clause); U. S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (Exceptions Clause).
169. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
170. Gunther, supra note 2, at 915.
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against all history and existing case law that a constitutional liberty
assuring access to federal courts did exist, there still could be no more
complete and unassailable due process than Congress's exercise of its
vested legislative powers checked by the President's executive power
to sign a statute restricting such access into law.
The second proposition, that the effects of a congressional statute
stripping abortion jurisdiction could not violate due process, provides
a more worthy, but ineffective, challenge. If Congress relieved the
federal courts ofjurisdiction over abortion, numerous state legislatures
would undoubtedly pass state statutes regulating abortion, including
criminalizing the acts of performing or procuring an abortion. Such
statutes would have previously violated the Supremacy Clause as a
result of Supreme Court precedent and Congress's silence on the issue.
These new statutes would surely raise constitutional challenges that
would be adjudicated in, and confined to, state court systems without
further federal review. Thus the highest court of a given state would
be the final determinant of the constitutionality of its state's statutes
regulating abortion. This predictable state of affairs would also not
violate constitutional due process because state courts and state
appellate review systems constitute due process of law under both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Since the outset of the United States as a sovereign nation, state
courts have served as acceptable and adequate forums for the
determination of cases involving the Constitution and laws of the
United States. During the debates surrounding the Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton spoke prophetically on this subject:
[S]tate courts will be divested of no part of their
primitive [common law, pre-constitutional]
jurisdiction... and... in every case in which they
were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the
national legislature, they will of course take
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may
give birth. . . . When . . . we consider the state
governments and the national government, as they
truly are... as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference
seems to be conclusive that the state courts would
have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising
under the laws of the union, where it was not
expressly prohibited.I"3
173. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Further, the Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."' 74
The due process considerations involved in relieving the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts ofjurisdiction over abortion is a puzzle
simplified by an ordered breakdown that applies the provisions of the
Constitution discussed above. First, the Constitution assigns legislative
mandates to Congress in Article I. Second, the Constitution assigns
executive mandates to the President in Article II. Third, the
Constitution assigns and defines federal judicial mandates and
requirements in Article III. Fourth, the Fifth Amendment modifies all
previous constitutional text and requires that any federal legislative,
executive, or judicial action that deprives a constitutional liberty may
do so only through due process of law. Sixth, the Tenth Amendment
also modifies previous constitutional text and solidifies the historically
recognized concept of concurrent federal and state court systems by
asserting that all powers, which are not exclusively and expressly
assigned to the federal judiciary and not prohibited by the Constitution
(i.e., the power to hear and decide legal claims arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States), can be exercised by the
states. Seventh, the Fourteenth Amendment ensures the same
protection of individual rights against state government infringement
that the Fifth Amendment ensures against federal infringement.
Eighth, Congress has passed judiciary acts and other statutes
containing affirmative grants of federal subject matter jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Finally, Congress passes
an act that specifically constricts previously exercised federal
jurisdiction in compliance with Articles I and III, which does not
violate the Fifth Amendment-as a result of the Tenth Amendment's
mandate and the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, that
act is signed into law by the President in compliance with Article II.
Many of the issues discussed in this Section were definitively
elaborated by the Supreme Court in Palmore v. United States.' In
Palmore the defendant was convicted of a felony in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia for "carrying an unregistered pistol in the
District of Columbia after having been (previously] convicted of a
felony."' 76 Palmore's conviction was upheld by the District of
174. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
175. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
176. Id. at 391.
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Columbia Court of Appeals and he then appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court. '77
Congress passed the statute under which Palmore was convicted
in accordance with its plenary power to "exercise all the police and
regulatory powers [within the District of Columbia] which a state
legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state
or local purposes.' 7 ' Through its previous exercise of this power,
Congress established the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
"with jurisdiction equivalent to that exercised by state courts"'79 and
composed its bench of judges "appointed by the President and
serv[ing] for terms of 15 years."' 80 Additionally, Congress established
that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was "the 'highest court
of the District of Columbia' for purposes of... [appellate] review by
[the Supreme Court]" and established that the decisions of the
District's court of appeals were "not . . .subject to review by the
United States Court of Appeals."'
Palmore argued that his conviction was not valid because it rested
on a statute passed by Congress which constituted a law of the United
States and invoked the judicial power of Article III. Therefore, he
asserted that he was improperly tried before a non-Article III judge.'
Palmore asserted that the Constitution vested the United Statesjudicial
power "in courts with judges holding office during good behavior and
whose salar[ies] cannot be diminished."'8 3 He essentially argued that
"an [Article] III judge must preside over every proceeding in which a
charge, claim, or defense is based on an Act of Congress or a law




Upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court first discussed
Congress's Article III plenary power, "except in enumerated
instances," to distribute and organize the judicial power of the United
States. 5 The Court stated,
Congress plainly understood this [power], for until
1875 Congress refrained from providing the lower
federal courts with general federal-question
jurisdiction. Until that time, the state courts provided
177. Id. at 389.
178. Id. at 397 (referring to U. S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 17).
179. Id. at 392 n.2.
180. Id. at 392-93.
181. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 392 n.2.
182. Id. at 393-94.
183. Id. at 400.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 401.
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the only forum for vindicating many important
federal claims. Even then, with exceptions, the state
courts remained the sole forum for the trial of federal
cases not involving the required jurisdictional
amount, and for the most part retained concurrent
jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view,
therefore, that trial and decision of all federal
questions were reserved for Art[icle] III judges.1
86
This statement speaks directly to the first prong discussed in the
beginning of this section."' Applying the reasoning of the Palmore
Court to the concept of an abortion jurisdiction removal statute elicits
the following conclusion: a congressional statute that restricts federal
jurisdiction encompassing "[c]ases . . .arising under . . . [the]
Constitution ... [and] the Laws of the United States"'88 or federal
question cases, does not, on its face, violate due process because it is
within the discretion authorized Congress by the Constitution. The
Court noted their conclusion by stating,
It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress
has read the Constitution as requiring every federal
question .. .to be tried in an Art[icle] III court
before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and
protection against salary reduction. Rather, both
Congress and this Court have recognized that state
courts are appropriate forums in which federal
questions ...may at times be tried; and that the
requirements of Art[icle] III .. .must in proper
circumstances give way to accomodate plenary
grants of power to Congress to legislate .... "'
The Court in Palmore also touched upon the characteristics of the
second prong previously identified in this section.190 Although the
context ofPalmore involves the affirmative assignment ofjurisdiction
to local District of Columbia courts that Congress established and not
the removal of previously allowable jurisdiction, the Court's reasoning
186. Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added).
187. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
188. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
189. Palmore, 389 U.S. at 407-08.
190. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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on the topic of due process is not distinguishable and is equally
pertinent to jurisdiction removal. The Court concluded that
Palmore was no more disadvantaged and no more
entitled to an Art[icle] III judge than any other
citizen of any of the 50 States who is tried for a
strictly local crime. Nor did his trial by a nontenured
judge deprive him of due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment any more than the trial of citizens
of the various States for local crimes by judges
without protection as to tenure deprives them of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 91
As noted previously, if Congress passes an act eradicating all
federal court jurisdiction over abortion cases, at least some state
legislatures would likely pass statutes criminalizing abortion. The
Palmore Court precisely summarized the concepts of concurrent
jurisdiction that would preclude the effects of a congressional abortion
jurisdiction removal act from violating due process.
The Constitution, as evidenced by "the Madisonian Compromise
that Congress is not obligated to establish inferior federal courts," has
never questioned "that state courts... [are] an adequate forum for the
protection of constitutional rights."' 92
[D]ue process does in some cases mean judicial
process. Consequently, Congress is not free to
control the jurisdiction of the state courts so as to
foreclose the vindication of the constitutional right to
[all] judicial review. But the Constitution is
indifferent whether that access is to a federal or a
state court. 1
93
The Constitution provides no guarantee of a federal judicial forum
for constitutional claims. State court systems, held accountable by the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide due process of law to adjudicate
constitutional claims. As a result, if Congress exercised its plenary
powers to except Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction
over abortion, the statute, on its face, would not violate the Due
191. Palmore, 389 U.S. at 410.
192. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 429; see also Gunther, supra note 2, at 915-
16 (summarizing academic commentary and concluding that state courts satisfy due
process for the adjudication of constitutional rights).
193. Bator, supra note 37, at 1033-34 (footnote omitted).
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The statute's predictable
effects, the adjudication of abortion-centered constitutional claims in
state courts without federal appellate review, would also not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
3. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." '194 Because the Fifth Amendment is
interpreted "to include an equal protection guarantee,"' 9 5 any
congressional jurisdiction removal statute that barred access to federal
courts and the Supreme Court's appellate review based on race or
ethnicity would not survive constitutional scrutiny.'96 However, a
jurisdiction removal statute covering a specific legal topic would cut
evenly, affecting no identifiable class of individuals differently,
because the statute would address the assignment of subject matter
jurisdiction rather than individual legal rights.
Neither the equal protection clause nor any other
clause of the Constitution requires equal
jurisdictional treatment for different subject-matters
of litigation. If it is asserted that this "discriminates"
against a certain category of federal right, the answer
must be that such discriminations-that is, the power
to pick and choose among different categories and
subject matters of federal cases-is precisely the
power that article III sought to grant. Ultimately the
assertion must rest on the notion that there is a
constitutional right as such to litigate certain
categories of cases in the lower federal courts [with
Supreme Court appellate review]-a notion which
seems ... to be plainly erroneous. 197
It is wholly possible to envision an equal protection argument that
asserts that abortion jurisdiction removal prejudices women as a
collective class. However, because
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
195. Gunther, supra note 2, at 916.
196. See id.
197. Bator, supra note 37, at 1036 (emphasis added).
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[A]rticle III . . . gave Congress the power [and
discretion] to decide how to channel federal issues as
between federal and state courts, assigning some
classes of cases to the state courts does not
"discriminate against," or "burden," or "prejudice"
the [individual] rights involved in those cases. On
their face at least, properly drafted jurisdiction-
channelling bills do not distinguish between litigants
or on the basis of particular outcomes but rather on
the basis of the types of issues raised.19
Furthermore, the predictable effects of a statute stripping abortion
jurisdiction would not violate equal protection for the same reasons
that the statute would not be unconstitutional on its face and for the
same reasons expounded in the due process section of this
Comment'99 -the assignment of jurisdiction among state and federal
courts is within the express and plenary constitutional powers of
Congress under Article III. Therefore, the inferred equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment would not provide a viable barrier
to a congressional statute relieving the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts of jurisdiction over the legal topic of abortion.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF JURISDICTION REMOVAL TO
ABORTION
To apply the preceding constitutional discussion in real life,
congressional legislators should attack the issue of abortion
jurisdiction removal with three necessary goals in mind. First, the
statute must be introduced as a bill in both houses of Congress and
must pass both houses of Congress. Second, the bill, as passed by
Congress, must be signed into law by the President. Third, the statute
must be constitutionally sound to ensure that it is judicially upheld
upon predictable challenge.
In light of the information provided in Part III of this Comment,
it is realistic to borrow the words of Professor Bator and assert that
a correctly drafted [congressional] statute that does
nothing more than provide that a given category of
case or controversy [such as abortion] arising under
the Federal Constitution [through the Bill of Rights]
198. Gunther, supra note 2, at 918 (emphasis added).
199. See supra Part Ill. C. 2.
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or laws shall revert to the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the state courts is valid, so long as it
does not create discriminations which the
Constitution independently prohibits and is not
wholly irrational and arbitrary.
2 00
The details of legislative drafting, debate, and voting tactics are best
left to the experts-congressmen and their staffs; therefore, they are
not within the scope of this Comment. However, there are two aspects
of congressional legislation that would relieve the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts of abortion jurisdiction that require brief
highlighting and elaboration.
First, an abortion jurisdiction removal statute will require simple
majority passage (fifty percent plus one) of both houses of Congress
and the President's signature in order to become a law.20 1 "The
Constitution's procedures for adopting laws [in Article I] assume that
a majority vote in each house... [is] sufficient to enact a law, and the
Constitution expressly outlines those situations where supermajority
votes are required." ' While this may seem obvious to the casual
observer, the potential bill's treatment in the Senate requires special
consideration because "a bill must pass both the House and Senate in
identical form and be signed by the President during a single two-year
Congress to become a law.
2 0 3
Because the Senate allows "unlimited debate on any measure,"
Senate Rule XXII enables a single senator to block a Senate vote on
any bill by requiring a supermajority vote of sixty senators to invoke
cloture ("an end of debate") and allow a Senate vote on the bill.2 °
"[A] cloture petition may be made at any time if signed by sixteen
senators. 20 5 For cloture to be invoked, the petition must be carried by
a three-fifths vote of the entire Senate, or sixty votes.20 6 The modem
"stealth filibuster," made possible by "two-track" Senate floor
management, does not require a senator to hold the floor to filibuster
and "permits the Senate to consider anything but [the] objectionable
legislation." ' 7 As a result, "[a] credible threat that forty-one senators
will refuse to vote for cloture on a bill is enough to keep that bill off
200. Bator, supra note 37, at 1037 (emphasis added).
201. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV.
181, 239 (1997).
202. Id. at 224.
203. Id. at 184.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 198.
206. Id. at 198 n. 91.
207. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 201, at 203.
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the floor . . . until it has the sixty votes necessary for cloture."' 8
Boldly assuming that an abortion jurisdiction removal bill would pass
the House of Representatives, there are three possible avenues by
which to overcome the predictable filibuster that would follow the
introduction and committee survival of such a bill in the Senate.
First, senators sponsoring or supporting such legislation should
ensure the reliability of sixty votes necessary to invoke cloture. After
accomplishing this monumental task, the senators should have
previously prepared cloture petitions, immediately invoke cloture, and
proceed to vote on the matter.2"9 Second, if the assurance of sixty votes
proves impossible or very unlikely, the Senate majority leadership
could ignore any hold request on the legislation, force filibustering
senators to actively hold the Senate floor, and require around-the-clock
sessions until the issue was resolved.10 Third, an abortion jurisdiction
removal bill could be drafted originally as, or incorporated into, a
budget or reconciliation bill, upon which filibustering is not
allowed."' To be considered a reconciliation bill, the potential
jurisdiction removal statute would have to be "germane" to the federal
budget, which, although unlikely, is by no means unimaginable."
In summary, the first practical application aspect of federal
abortion jurisdiction removal legislation is that a great deal of
planning, work, strategy, professional diplomacy, and teamwork will
be required of the bill's sponsors. In addition to preparing realistic
Senate filibuster defenses, congressional legislators that introduce such
legislation must lay the necessary groundwork in order to ensure
committee support and floor scheduling, a majority of votes in both the
House and the Senate, and presidential support of the Act.
The second key aspect of abortionjurisdiction removal legislation
lays in the wording of the statute. "Jurisdictional statutes are . . .
construed [by the Supreme Court] 'with precision and with fidelity to
the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes." 2 3 As a result,
an abortion jurisdiction removal statute must use clear, plain, and
express terms excepting otherwise permissible federal jurisdiction over
the legal issue of abortion." 4 Because of the history and political
landscape surrounding abortion, the language of the statute should
208. Id.
209. See id. at 205.
210. See id. at 204-06.
211. See id. at 215.
212. Id. at 216.
213. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 396 (1973) (quoting Cheng Fan
Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 212 (1968)).
214. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1868); Durousseau
v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 316 (1810).
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give rise to no other inferences and should be designed to avoid any
possible narrow construction or application by the Supreme Court. The
statute also must be worded in a manner that offends neither Articles
I and III, nor the Supremacy, Due Process, and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution. The statute's drafters may also wish to
word the statute in a manner that precludes the Supreme Court from
exercising original jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus that encompasses abortion-related subject matter.2t 5
Additionally, the statute must specifically except Supreme Court
federal question appellate jurisdiction over decisions issued by the
states' highest courts in cases involving abortion. The state court
certiorari provision of the United States Code states that
[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had,
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the... validity of a statute of any
State is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, or where any ... right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
211Constitution.
Abortion cases implicate this general federal -question appellate
jurisdiction because they hinge on constitutional claims pertaining to
individual rights.217 As a result, in order to confine the legal issue of
abortion to state adjudication, the jurisdiction removal statute must
specifically except the affirmative grant of appellate jurisdiction
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
While the concept ofjurisdiction removal itself is bold, an attempt
at federal abortion jurisdiction removal without proper preparation
would be ill-advised and potentially embarrassing. In order to secure
the goals of majority passage in both houses of Congress, the signing
of the statute into law by the President, and the statute's judicial
validation, members of Congress should apply the practical
information listed above. To do otherwise would risk potential failure
215. See generally Moss, supra note 66, at 255-58 (discussing the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretation of a congressional jurisdiction removal statute in Felker
v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), as not repealing the Court's "'authority to entertain
original habeas petitions' because [the statute] did not do so explicitly").
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(c) (2000).
217. See supra note 165.
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in attempts to accomplish all of these necessary goals and the resulting
failure of the legislation as a whole.
It is crucial to note that, in 1803, the Supreme Court and Chief
Justice John Marshall established the enduring concept of judicial
review with the decision of Marbury v. Madison.2 18 In short, judicial
review is the absolute surety in the American polity that legal
determination of the constitutionality of an existing law of the United
States lies, when exercised, within the "province and duty" of the
judicial branch. 21 9 The Supreme Court thus may make a temporally
binding determination as to whether a particular law is
constitutional.220
As a result, this entire discussion ofjurisdiction removal assumes
that any statute restricting federal and Supreme Courtjurisdiction over
abortion would be quickly challenged on the basis of its
constitutionality in a justiciable case by a party with standing to
prosecute the action in a federal court. It assumes that the case would
make its way through the federal court system and could be finally
heard in the Supreme Court in a decision regarding its
constitutionality. However, despite the understandable, knee-jerk
assumption that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari to hear such
a constitutional challenge as a result of the extensive history of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic of abortion and the great
public attention that such a jurisdiction removal statute would garner,
there are at least two reasons why the Supreme Court would not rule
on such a case. Both are rooted in the definition of the legal issue.
The issue that an abortion jurisdiction removal statute would
present to any federal court is one of congressional control of federal
subject matter jurisdiction rather than an issue of abortion rights or
legality. This clarification places the issue squarely within the express,
textual provisions of the Constitution-provisions that are clear on
their face and have been open to no other interpretation.221 As a result,
there are at least two ways by which the Supreme Court could refuse
to hear such a case. First, a federal district court or court of appeals
could uphold the constitutionality of an abortion jurisdiction removal
statute, dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court could deny the subsequent request for certiorari. Second, the
Supreme Court could abstain from hearing such a case, classifying it
218. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
219. Id. at 177-78.
220. Id.
221. See supra Parts III.A., III.B.
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as a political question,222 and, thereby, effectively endorsing the statute
as a valid exercise of constitutionally enumerated congressional
power.
Additionally, in light of the abundant proof that an act of Congress
removing all subject matterjurisdiction over the topic of abortion from
federal courts would be wholly constitutional, there is another
paramount reason why the Supreme Court, if it heard the merits of a
constitutional challenge to the statute, would uphold its
constitutionality. The Supreme Court would undoubtedly uphold such
a statute because any Justice joining a majority opinion deeming an
abortion removal statute unconstitutional could likely and justifiably
be subject to impeachment. 2 3 Remembering that the legal issue would
be whether the exercise of express, enumerated and discretionary,
congressional prerogative was constitutional, any decision striking
down such a properly drafted statute would amount to usurpation.224
"[T]he Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation
of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states,
whose representatives control the legislative process and ... have
broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress. 
2 5
Contrarily, legislators will stand on very firm ground, the firmest
ground known to the law and the citizens of the United States-the
Constitution-if and when they remove abortion jurisdiction from
federal courts and such removal is constitutionally challenged in
federal court.
222. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a political
question as "[a] question that a court will not consider because it involves the exercise
of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of government").
223. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The [federal] Judges ... shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of
Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.... And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present."). Note that this two thirds vote requirement is identical to the amount of
votes necessary to invoke cloture and vote on a filibustered federal abortionjurisdiction
removal statute. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("Judgment in Cases of
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification
to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.").
224. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999) (defining usurpation
as "[t]he unlawful seizure and assumption of another's position, office, or authority");
see also Robert H. Bork, American Conservatism: The Soul of the Law, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 20, 2003, at A14 (arguing that the separation of powers must be restored from
usurpation by the state and federal courts continuing trend away from the text of the
Constitution).
225. See Wechsler, supra note 65, at 559.
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V. CONCLUSION
The express powers delegated in the Ordain and Establish and
Exceptions Clauses of the Constitution grant Congress plenary,
discretionary power to statutorily remove abortion subject matter
jurisdiction from all federal courts and the Supreme Court. Supreme
Courtjurisprudence on the topic of congressional jurisdiction removal
has consistently supported this conclusion. The Supremacy, Due
Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution provide no
legal barriers to Congress's exercise of this plenary power. In fact, the
plenary power of Congress to define and restrict federal court
jurisdiction and to make exceptions to Supreme Court appellate
subject matter jurisdiction makes the concept of judicial review,
amplified by stare decisis, tolerable in a democratic republic." 6 While
the exercise of this jurisdiction removal power could be politically
complicated, congressional sponsors and supporters of such legislation
can accomplish its successful implementation through careful
legislative and political planning and meticulous drafting. The legal
credibility of such an effort lies firmly planted in the strongest legal
authority-the express provisions of Articles I and III of the
Constitution.
Blessed is the man who finds wisdom, the man who
gains understanding, for she is more profitable than
silver and yields better returns than gold .... Long
life is in her right hand; in her left hand are riches
and honor. Her ways are pleasant ways, and all her
paths are peace. She is a tree of life to those who
embrace her; those who lay hold of her will be
blessed227
In 1984, while addressing the subject of congressional jurisdiction
removal, Professor Gunther cautioned that one must appreciate the
distinction "between constitutionality and wisdom" and that what the
226. See Bator, supra note 37, at 1032 (stating the argument that the author of
this Comment accepts); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 181, 183 (summarizing
scholarly arguments "that such congressional power is an essential democratic check
on the power of an unelected judiciary"); Gunther, supra note 2, at 911 (stating that
"the existence of congressional power over federal jurisdiction ... is 'the rock on
which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy"') (citation omitted);
Pfander, supra note 87, at 1437-38 (describing the argument as that of"a majoritarian
check on what [Congress] sees as an unwarranted line of Supreme Court decisional
law").
227. Proverbs 3:13-18 (New Int'l Version).
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"Constitution authorizes" should not "be confused with what sound
constitutional statesmanship admonishes." '228  However, the
circumstances surrounding federal abortion jurisprudence may have
proceeded to a point at which otherwise appropriate conservatism in
refraining from exercising congressional power over federal
jurisdiction has begun to tend against greater wisdom and "sound
constitutional statesmanship." Throughout the illustrious history of our
nation, wisdom and constitutional statesmanship have never been, and
they are not now, achieved through conditioned, inside-the-box
thinking. At this point in our history, true wisdom, necessity, and
realism may favor the drastic measure of total removal of abortion
jurisdiction from the federal courts and the Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia, in his Stenberg v. Carhart29 dissent, while clearly
not recommending jurisdiction removal and only referring specifically
to partial-birth abortions, most eloquently expressed the sentiment that
this Comment applies to the legal topic of abortion:
I cannot understand why those who acknowledge
that, in the opening words of Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, "[t]he issue of abortion is one of the
most contentious and controversial in contemporary
American society"... persist in the belief that [the
Supreme Court], armed with neither constitutional
text nor accepted tradition, can resolve that
contention and controversy rather than be consumed
by it. If only for the sake of its own preservation, the
Court should return this matter to the people-where
the Constitution, by its silence on the subject, left
it-and let them decide, State by State, whether this
practice should be allowed. 3 °
This sentiment was voiced before the birth of the Constitution by
James Madison who stated, "[T]he powers reserved to the several
states will extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state."
23
Considering the preceding discussion of the Supremacy Clause
and the differences between the Constitution and constitutional law,
23 2
228. Gunther, supra note 2, at 898 (emphasis added).
229. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
230. Id. at 956 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
23 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
232. See supra Part III.C. 1.
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and the concepts of separation of powers and federalism,233 consider
the following quotation from Justice Breyer, which discusses the
divergent views on the topic of abortion: "Taking account of these
virtually irreconcilable points of view [on abortion] ... constitutional
law must govern a society whose different members sincerely hold
directly opposing views ... ."234 Is this a correct assertion? Have we
collectively descended to a level at which truly divisive issues are
incapable of constitutional political resolution through representative
self-government that moves with the will of the majority while not at
the expense of the minority's individual rights? As evidenced by the
constitutional provisions discussed in this Comment, the answer to
these questions sounds unequivocally in the negative. Thus, the next
questions that must be answered are: "Should Congress, as the voice
of the electorate, relieve the federal courts of jurisdiction over
abortion?" and "Why?"
Whether Congress should remove all abortion jurisdiction from
federal courts and why it should do so are questions that must be
answered by congressional legislators and their constituents. The fact-
finding and investigational capabilities of Congress dwarf those of the
lower federal courts, the Supreme Court, any existing lobby or
organization, and, frankly, those of this author. However, two
conclusions are abundantly clear. First, abortion is not foreclosed as
a legal or political topic merely because the Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld and expanded its legal practice. Second, Congress
may, at its collective discretion, remove all abortion subject matter
jurisdiction from all federal courts and the Supreme Court, in
accordance with the plenary powers delegated to Congress by the
United States Constitution-the supreme law of this land.
233. See supra Part II.
234. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920-21 (emphasis added).
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